A revival of technology-assisted voting in New South Wales (NSW) is likely to necessitate more extensive legislative changes than initially anticipated, according to the final review on technology-assisted voting (TAV). Published about two weeks ago, the report contains notable differences from the interim version released in August.
The key modification involves an increased emphasis on legislative support for TAV services in future state and local government elections. While the interim report primarily focused on legislative changes to prevent TAV system failures from invalidating election results, the final report recommends three additional legislative adjustments.
The first proposed change aims to extend the time “between the close of candidate nominations and subsequent ballot paper draws” for upper and lower house elections. The review expresses concern that the current timeframe, tailored to a paper-based process, does not allow sufficient time for formatting a digital voting system. Lengthening this period would provide more time for adequate preparation and user testing of future TAV systems.
The second recommended change pertains to how preferences are counted for NSW upper house elections. The report criticizes the existing method for not fully utilizing digital scanning and counting technology, suggesting that computational data entry and full electronic distribution of preferences would enhance the assessment of election outcomes in the event of TAV system issues.
The third legislative change proposes streamlining the display of parties, groups, and candidates on the upper house ballot paper. The report highlights the challenges of digitizing lengthy paper-based ballots, particularly in internet-based channels, where it can lead to cumbersome scrolling and allegations of unfair preferential positioning.
The report also elevates cyber threats as a significant concern for reintroducing TAV in NSW. It emphasizes the high-risk nature of internet voting, citing a worsening cyber and misinformation threat environment involving state and criminal actors. The final report emphasizes that the processes for verifying votes and ensuring security are not well understood by electors or political participants.
Regarding the potential benefits of linking digital identity systems to TAV, the final report takes a more cautious stance compared to the interim report. While the interim report was confident in the benefits of requiring digital identity for TAV platforms, the final report introduces qualifiers such as ‘may’ and ‘could,’ acknowledging that digital identity requirements could strengthen integrity and trust in TAV platforms.
The report suggests that Vision Australia may have influenced the tempered language regarding digital ID benefits, citing the organization’s reservations about MyGovID’s usability and adoption rates. The final report maintains the interim report’s recommendations for scoping and costing internet voting for a small-scale revival in the 2027 state election and proposes limited-scale digital voting kiosk trials for the 2028 local government elections. However, the implementation of either is contingent on finding a cost-effective and legislatively supported technology-based solution within the stipulated timeframes.
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